For years, proximity in Bluetooth meant reading the received signal strength and mapping it to a distance with a path-loss model. It never worked well. Signal strength falls off with distance in theory, but in the real world it is dominated by antenna orientation, the human body, and multipath — reflections that arrive out of phase and make a near device look far or a far device look near. Worse, it is trivially spoofed: amplify the signal and a device three rooms away looks like it is in your hand, which is exactly the relay attack that has plagued keyless entry.
Channel Sounding replaces the guess with a measurement. Phase-based ranging reads the phase of the carrier at many frequencies across the 2.4 GHz band; because phase rotates with distance at a rate that depends on frequency, the slope of phase against frequency is a direct, fine measure of range. Round-trip time complements it by timing a signal to the far device and back, which gives an absolute distance and, because both ends participate in the exchange, a reference an attacker cannot fake by simply making the signal louder. Together they resolve to an unambiguous distance at centimetre scale, with the multi-frequency sweep handling the multipath that defeats signal strength.
The measurement runs between a connected pair — one device the initiator, the other the reflector — so it fits naturally into a normal Bluetooth connection rather than needing new radios. That is the strategic point: Channel Sounding turns the Bluetooth already in a phone, a car key, a tag or an earbud into a secure ranging sensor, which is why it matters for digital car keys and access control, for finding devices, and for indoor positioning. Distance is only half of a position, though — range says how far, not in which direction — so for a full location fix it pairs with angle-of-arrival, which supplies the bearing that Channel Sounding does not.