Secure identity silicon anchors a device's identity in hardware rather than asserting it in software. Smart card is the most visible application, but the same platform serves secure microcontrollers, industrial controllers, IoT provisioning and trusted hardware for edge infrastructure. Described here at property level; mechanism is discussed under NDA.
| Application | What identity is doing | Typical constraint |
|---|---|---|
| Payment and banking credentials | Binding a credential to specific hardware | Certification regime and transaction time |
| Government identity and ePassport-class | High-assurance personalisation and verification | Evaluation and assurance requirements |
| Enterprise access | Credentials that cannot be trivially duplicated | Cost per credential at scale |
| Healthcare identity | Practitioner and patient credentials with audit needs | Retention and privacy regime |
| Transit and mobility | High-throughput contactless transactions | Transaction time in a contactless field |
| IoT device identity | Onboarding and provisioning at fleet scale | Factory flow and cost per unit |
| Secure MCUs and industrial controllers | Protecting firmware integrity over long lifetimes | Service life of a decade or more |
| Trusted hardware for edge infrastructure | Attesting what a node is before trusting it with work | Integration with existing attestation frameworks |
Claims are made at property level: what the hardware provides, what it resists, and how it integrates. Mechanism, circuit architecture and implementation detail are not published, and no useful buyer decision depends on them being published.
Language is chosen with the same care. Tamper-evident is described as tamper-evident, and not escalated to the stronger word. No system is described as impossible to attack. Where a claim depends on an assumption or a configuration, the assumption is stated.
Detailed technical discussion happens under a non-disclosure agreement, where the mechanism, the threat model and the evaluation evidence are all available.
A root of trust is the component a system's security ultimately depends on, and which cannot be verified by anything beneath it. Placing it in silicon means device identity and boot integrity derive from the physical part rather than from replaceable software.
No. Smart card SoC is the most visible application. The same platform serves secure microcontrollers, industrial controllers, IoT device identity and provisioning, transit and access credentials, and trusted hardware for edge infrastructure.
Because mechanism, circuit architecture and implementation detail belong under a non-disclosure agreement, and a buyer's decision to open a conversation does not depend on them. Public material covers properties, capabilities, integration and assurance.
Typically mature nodes between 180 nm and 90 nm, because embedded non-volatile memory options, analog performance and long supply horizons matter more for these parts than density does.
Tell us the specification, the constraint and the deadline. Programmes that cross silicon, radio, embedded and AI are where Faststream is strongest.